Reflection: What is said in courts

A number of scholars have pointed out that in courtroom discourse participants may retreat to a notion of what is literally said (see, for example, Mosegaard-Hansen 2008). Questions and answers in the courtroom may therefore be formulated very carefully in some instances to ensure that what is said1 matches what is normatively made available as meant or said2. A retreat to literal meaning in courtroom discourse was made particularly infamous by former US President Bill Clinton in his deposition in August 1998 to a grand jury about whether he had lied, and so committed perjury, in a prior deposition in January that year in statements about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. He was asked about reports that he had said to aides in reference to Monica Lewinsky there’s nothing going on between us. He explained why this wasn’t lying, even though it subsequently emerged that he had had an affair with her, through a retreat to what is literally meant by his claim, as we can see from the following excerpt from his deposition:

While Clinton performed some fairly impressive – or disingenuous depending on one’s perspective – verbal gymnastics in re-contextualizing his prior statement, strictly speaking Clinton was quite right in what he asserted here. He never said there was never at any point anything going on between himself and Lewinsky. By saying1 there’s nothing going on between us he might have (reasonably) been understood as saying2 “there has never been anything going on between us”, but that’s not what he said1. Instead, he argued he had simply said2, “there’s nothing going on between us at the moment”. The literal notion of what is said has thus saved a presidency, amongst other things.