Semantic vs. syntactic markers

The presence of syntactic and semantic markers with identical names (Male, Female, Abstract, etc.) offers strong prima facie ground for the suspicion that the distinction between semantic and syntactic markers - a distinction theoretically crucial for KF is ill-founded. Let us first compare the functions of these putatively separate types of element in the theory.

The function of semantic markers in KF is to express those components of the total meaning of a dictionary entry for which the theory is accountable; more specifically, they express those elements of a meaning of a word upon which the projection rules operate. Hence the semantic markers of words" are those elements which, after being suitably amalgamated by the projection rules, yield an interpretation of the sentence which is unambiguous, n ways ambiguous, or anomalous. A general criterion of economy would presumably require that there be as few markers (primes) as possible; hence, the analyst should aim to add markers only when failure to do so would result in a failure to mark ambiguities or anomalies of sentences. The general principle would seem to be that no semantic marker should appear in the path of any dictionary entry unless it also appears in the selection restrictions of at least one other entry.¹

Let us take an example. Suppose the difference between the nouns ball₁ ‘gala affair’ and ball₂ ‘spherical object’ were formulated in terms of distinguishers. Then the theory could not explain the ambiguity of sentence (7i), nor could it mark the anomaly of (7 ii) or (7 iii). Hence, the dictionary must be revised by the addition of suitable semantic markers, such as (Event) and (Object). And, as we have seen in (2) above, the addition of a marker (= feature) is equivalent to a step in subcategorization.

(7) (i) I observed the ball.

(ii) I attended the ball₂.

(iii) I burned the ball₁.

Now what leads a linguist to increase the delicacy of subcategorization in syntax?² The reasons turn out to be precisely the same as those for semantics: a subcategorization step is taken if failure to do so would make the grammar generate (a) ill-formed expression or (b) ambiguous sentences.

(a) Suppose a grammar of English were to contain the following rules:

(8)(i) S → NP +VP

(ii) VP → V+ (NP)

(iii) NP → Tom, Bill

(iv) V → liked, waited

These rules would generate not only Tom liked Bill and Tom waited, but also *Tom liked and *Tom waited Bill. To prevent the latter, undesirable result, we must reformulate rules (8 ii) and (8 iv) to show a subcategorization, e.g.:

The addition of the syntactic markers t and i corresponds in form and motivation to the addition of (Event) and (Object) in preventing (= marking as anomalous) such expressions as (7iii) ‘I burned the gala affair’.

(b) Suppose an English grammar were to allow VPs consisting of Copula+ Nomen, and fat were a ‘Nomen’. This would permit such sentences as This substance is fat without exhibiting their ambiguity. One reason³ for subcategorizing ‘Nomen’ into Noun and Adjective would be to mark this ambiguity. This is exactly comparable to the introduction of markers for exhibiting the ambiguity of (7 i).

The typical examples of syntactic ambiguity are of a ‘ bifocal ’ kind, e.g. The statistician studies the whole year or He left his car with his girl friend. That is to say, if an insufficiently delicate subcategorization, as in (9), were to be brought to a degree of delicacy at which the ambiguity were to be exhibited, two interconnected revisions would have to be made: Verbs would have to be divided into transitive and intransitive, and NPs would correspondingly have to be divided into objects, dominated by VP, and adverb-like Temporals. The great rarity of unifocal ambiguities in grammar -even in languages with very poor morphology (cf. Chao 1959)-is itself an interesting comment on the general design of language. However, unifocal syntactic ambiguities do exist, as do bifocal semantic ones.⁴

KF asks if ‘ the line between grammatical and semantic markers can be drawn in terms of the theoretical function they perform ’ (p. 209), and comes to the conclusion that a criterion is available: ‘grammatical markers mark the formal differences on which the distinction between well-formed and ill-formed strings of morphemes rests, whereas semantic markers have the function of giving each well-formed string the conceptual content that permits it to be represented in terms of the message they communicate to speakers in normal situations’⁵ But this conclusion only begs the question; as we have seen, the distinction between grammatical and semantic anomalies is still unexplained. Instead of being dispelled, the confusion that ‘has been generated in the study of language by the search for a line between grammar and semantics’ is only increased by the disguised circularity of the KF argument.

The only issue in KF on which the ‘ met theoretical ’ distinction between syntactic and semantic markers has a substantive bearing is the problem of markers of both kinds which ‘happen to’ have the same names. It is proposed, for example, that baby be marked semantically as (Human), but grammatically as nonHuman (hence it is pronominalized by it), whereas ship is treated in the reverse way. The problem, however, has been solved in a purely grammatical way since Antiquity in terms either of mixed genders or of double gender membership.⁶ Besides, it is unlikely that the marking of baby as (Human) would solve any semantic problems, since most things predicable of humans who are not babies could no more be predicated of babies than of animals (i.e. nonHumans): is The baby hates its relatives any less odd than The kitten hates its relatives? Most importantly, however, this solution fails to represent as a productive process the reference (especially by men) to lovingly handled objects by means of she. The patent fact is that any physical object can in English be referred to by she with a special semantic effect. (For a suggestion as to how such a process may be incorporated in a theory.

To summarize, we have seen that the KF distinction between syntactic and semantic markers is not based, as claimed, on the functions of these entities. The only possibility remaining is that the distinction is based on the content. For example, semantic markers may be claimed to have some denotative content, whereas the syntactic markers would have none. But this would run counter to the spirit of the whole enterprise, which is to explicate intralinguistic semantic phenomena without resort to extraverbal correlations. We can only conclude that if formal linguistics is not to be renounced altogether, the distinction between semantic and syntactic markers claimed by KF is non-existent.

¹ The marking of ambiguities, without regard to their resolution, is not a sufficient criterion, since an ambiguity can be marked more economically by a branching of the distinguishers after the last semantic marker. Moreover, the only speaker skill for which KF is made accountable is the interpretation of sentences, not the critique of dictionaries. KF alludes to ‘maximization of systematic economy’ but does not elaborate on this intriguing idea.

² The question of subcategorization, even in pre-transformational syntax, has received little attention. See Xolodovič (i960).

³ There are other reasons, too. For instance, we must also show the bifurcation of fat in it looks fat₁ and it looks like fat₂ in order to prevent the formation of *This one is fat₂ter and *We have to select the right fat₁s.

⁴ Taking throw as ambiguous (T. to hurl; 2. to arrange ostentatiously’) and given the poly¬ semy of ball discussed above, note the bifocal ambiguity of She threw a ball. Another example is He arranged the music (Weinreich 1963 a: 143).

⁵ Quoted from p. 518 of the revised version (1964).

⁶ E.g. Hockett (1958: 232 ff.). On genders, see also n. 100 below [p. 472].