ACCESS TO LABORATORY SERVICES
The majority of forensic science laboratories in the United States are funded by the public and administered by a unit of federal, state, or local government. These laboratories support the functions of the parent agency or the government. Police officers, detectives, crime scene investigators, and prosecutors generally have open access to the services of the laboratory, including expert testimony by its forensic sciences at no cost to the other agency. Considering that the public pays for these services, it might seem obvious that a citizen accused of a crime should also have access to these services. That, however, is not the case. Very few public forensic science laboratories will permit accused persons access to forensic science services even if that person is willing and able to pay for them. How then do criminal defendants gain access to forensic science services? The options are limited. Private laboratories serve defendants (and anyone, really), but the cost is generally high and often courts will not authorize enough money for indigent defendants to cover the costs of analysis and testimony. If an accused person has a public defender for an attorney, most public defenders’ offices do not have sufficient funds to pay for analyzes of evidence. Even people willing and able to pay may not have a qualified forensic science laboratory available. This results in an imbalance in the resources available to the prosecution and defense in a criminal case. One of the recommendations made by the National Academy of Sciences was that forensic laboratories should be independent, either administratively or financially, from law enforcement (see ‘In More Detail: Laboratory Independence’).
IN MORE DETAIL: LABORATORY INDEPENDENCE Forensic service providers inhabit a necessary, if unique, role in the criminal justice system. The forensic sciences have many stakeholders, primarily the public they serve but also governmental ones, including law enforcement, attorneys and the courts. For historical and political reasons, most forensic service providers are administratively a subset of law enforcement agencies. Occupying a subordinate role in a para-military organization sets boundaries on the laboratory’s relationships with their parent agency and aligned agencies. For example, the laboratory director may be a sworn officer with no science education or training; this will affect the management of scientific resources depend ing on the officer. Being in law enforcement also frames the way in which externalities, such as budgets, politics and accreditation, are dealt with for the laboratory to perform adequately or succeed. Recently, the ‘law enforcement’ paradigm for forensic laboratories was challenged by the National Academy of Sciences’ 2009 report on the forensic sciences that recommended the forensic service providers be administratively or financially independent of law enforcement-based parent agencies. The community response varied and concerns were raised: What about political clout during the bud get process, who oversees the operations, how would the laboratory participate in investigations, what would be gained or lost through independence? In the face of these valid questions, some jurisdictions have created independent forensic agencies to meet the challenge of the NAS committee. Washington, D.C.’s Department of Forensic Sciences and the Houston Forensic Science, LGC in Texas are but two examples of forensic laboratories that have been created independent of law enforcement; some have already existed in that environment, such as Virginia’s Department of Forensic Sciences and Rhode Island’s Forensic Science Laboratory housed in its Department of Public Health. Their vision was for the laboratory director to have a voice equivalent with or at least proportional to others in the jurisdiction and the justice system on matters involving the laboratory and related agencies. The committee felt that the laboratory should also be able to establish and maintain prioritization of cases, expenditures and other resources while also having budgetary autonomy to set its own financial goals. It was hoped that by establishing forensic laboratories as separate but equal entities, the political and professional pressures related to the different goals, missions and values of scientific laboratories and law enforcement agencies could be mitigated, if not resolved. Independence is not a panacea, of course – the professional disaster at the Hinton, MA laboratory where Annie Dookhan worked was part of the Department of Health when the problems occurred, for example. And no government agency is truly independent; they serve the leaders the people of their jurisdiction elected. Removing forensic service providers from administrative oversight by law enforcement (to include prosecutor’s offices) does, however, address the ‘fox guarding the hen house’ issue; those responsible for acting on the jurisdiction’s or defendant’s behalf in court are not in charge of the neutral arbiter of facts that support or refute criminal allegations. The implication is not that all law enforcement oversight of laboratory functions is biased but that – purely based on mandated responsibilities – the potential for that particular brand of bias is greater than if the laboratories were independent. Other types of bias may occur but, as an independent agency, the laboratory can at least act on them without collateral repercussions and resistance due to professional cultural differences (Harris, 2012). It remains to be seen whether these “independent” laboratories will remain so or if political interference pushes aside the objectivity of science for prosecutorial gains. The question remains, however, how will the community move forward to evaluate and implement any new or adjusted business models for independent forensic laboratories. The need for strategic leadership in forensic science is critical and the lack of a historical systems-level view has slowed the development of strong strategic leadership. Forensic service providers, traditionally under law enforcement agencies, have had few opportunities to have a collective, distinctive political voice that served them alone. Whether the change is evolutionary or revolutionary remains to be seen; ‘the true measure of a successful revolution is the realization there is no going back’ (Davis, 2013).
