Two types of pragmatic meaning?

We have presented two radically different accounts of how users understand pragmatic meaning in the prior two subsections on understanding pragmatic meaning vis-à-vis utterance and discourse processing. On the one hand, there has been an attempt to systematize the analysis of pragmatic meaning through theoretically motivated abstraction from the discourse context. This leads us to a logico-analytical focus on putative or potential speaker-intended meaning at the utterance level. Meaning according to this view is grounded in the subjective processing domain of speakers and/or hearers; in other words, understandings of meaning which a speaker and hearer each individually reach, but which are assumed to be shared. Those who view pragmatics as a component of linguistics, on a par with semantics, syntax and phonology, tend to subscribe to this view. On the other hand, there has been an attempt to treat pragmatic meaning in its full context, as both individuated and historically situated meaning. This leads us to a focus on emergent or joint meaning at the discourse level. Pragmatic meaning according to this view is grounded in the intersubjective processing domain of participants: in other words, how users come to interactionally share understandings of meanings over time (although it is not assumed those meanings will necessarily be the same, since there are often multiple participation footings involved in interactions). As we shall also see, an examination of meaning at the discourse level tends to lead to a focus on discursive responsibility (i.e. who is taken to be committed to or accountable for what is meant) and (in)determinacy (i.e. the inevitable difficulties faced in attempting to definitively fi x pragmatic meaning).

Each approach represents a different perspective on understanding. In the utterance-processing view, the understanding of meaning is assumed to be relatively stable at punctuated points in time (cf. Verstehen). In the discourse-processing view, understandings of meaning are assumed to be dynamic and emergent over spans of time (cf. Verständigung). To illustrate this difference consider the following conversation:

Sirl’s initial utterance in turn 1 appears to have at least two layers of meaning. On the level of what is said, he is inquiring about what time Michael plans to leave that day, while at the level of what is implicated, he is opening up the possibility that he would like to use the bathroom first. Michael orients first to the level of what is said in estimating what time he expects to leave, and then to the possible implicature by offering a possible candidate account for why Sirl might want to use the bathroom first. What remains left unsaid here is thus whether or not they are really talking about using the bathroom. However, Sirl denies that he is in a hurry in turn 3, thereby treating his first utterance as simply seeking information about Michael’s movements. While it appeared from Sirl’s initial turn that he was raising the issue of the bathroom, it appears from his subsequent response in turn 3 that he was not meaning to implicate that he would like to use the bathroom first. In other words, Sirl’s utterance in turn 3 treats his prior turn as meaning something only at the level of what is said.

However, consider what subsequently followed in the same exchange:

There is a long pause in turn 4 after Sirl’s claim that he is not in a hurry. Indeed, the pause is so long it appears to indicate that something has been left unsaid. Michael’s subsequent offer for Sirl to use the bathroom thus opens up again the possibility that what is left unsaid is that Sirl wants to use the bathroom first. This offer is subsequently accepted by Sirl, the upshot of which is that Sirl was indeed opening up the possibility of using the bathroom first through his initial utterance in turn 1 and was not just seeking information. However, what is left unsaid is ultimately realized through an offer on the part of Michael rather than a request from Sirl, which has consequences for the degree to which Michael can hold Sirl accountable for this implicature.

An utterance-processing account of this excerpt would focus on how Michael interprets Sirl’s utterances, and vice versa, at the time at which they arise. A discourse-processing account of it would focus on how Michael’s understandings of Sirl’s utterances depends on the understandings he subsequently displays, and vice versa. One can argue that Sirl and Michael are doing both here. We can display this schematically as illustrated in Figure 5.2.

The arrow pointing from left to right in this figure represents the temporal constraint on processing meanings in interaction. The individuated boxes pointing to the ends of each turn above the main time arrow represent representations of utterance meanings. The interwoven boxes under the main time arrow represent the interweaving of speaker and recipient representations of speaker (and recipient) meanings. The dotted box underneath the interwoven boxes represents an instance of emergent meaning. The difference between the representations above the time arrow (representing those derived via utterance processing) and those representations below the time arrow (representing those derived via discourse processing) is that the former are formally independent of each other while the latter are formally interdependent.

The point of this figure is not to argue for one approach over the other. Clearly we can view time in both ways: as either punctuated points on a continuum or as interleaving spans across a continuum. It might be suggested that there are thus two important levels of understanding when it comes to pragmatic meaning: utterance meaning and discourse or interactional meaning. How these two levels of pragmatic meaning might interrelate must remain a question for future research.