Categorisation
المؤلف:
Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green
المصدر:
Cognitive Linguistics an Introduction
الجزء والصفحة:
C5-P168
2025-12-16
36
Categorisation
Another phenomenon that has received considerable attention within cognitive semantics is categorisation: our ability to identify entities as members of groups. Of course, the words we use to refer to entities rest upon categorisation: there are good reasons why we call a cat ‘cat’ and not, say, ‘fish’. One of the reasons behind the interest in this area stems from the ‘Cognitive Commitment’: the position adopted by cognitive linguists that language is a function of generalised cognition (Chapter 2). The ability to categorise is central to human cognition; given the ‘Cognitive Commitment’, we expect this ability to be reflected in linguistic organisation. The other reason behind the interest in this area relates to a question that has challenged philosophers (and, more recently, linguists) since ancient times: can word meaning be defined?
In the 1970s, pioneering research by cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues presented a serious challenge to the classical view of cate gorisation that had dominated Western thought since the time of Aristotle. According to this classical model, category membership is defined according to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, which entails that category membership is an ‘all-or-nothing’ affair. For example, as we observed in Chapter 2, the artefacts depicted in Figure 5.1 can, depending on the situation and the way the artefact is being used, be identified as members of the category CUP. However, these are not all ‘equal’ members of that category.

The findings of Eleanor Rosch and her team revealed that categorisation is not an all or nothing affair, but that many categorisation judgements seemed to exhibit prototype or typicality effects. For example, when we categorise birds, certain types of bird (like robins or sparrows) are judged as ‘better’ examples of the category than others (like penguins).
In his famous book Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, George Lakoff (1987) explored some of the consequences of the observations made by Rosch and her colleagues for a theory of conceptual structure as manifested in language. An important idea that emerged from Lakoff’s study is the theory of idealised cognitive models (ICMs), which are highly abstract frames. These can account for certain kinds of typicality effects in categorisation.
For example, let’s consider once more the concept BACHELOR. This is under stood with respect to a relatively schematic ICM MARRIAGE. The MARRIAGE ICM includes the knowledge that bachelors are unmarried adult males. As we have observed, the category BACHELOR exhibits typicality effects. In other words, some members of the category BACHELOR (like eligible young men) are ‘better’ or more typical examples than others (like the Pope). The knowledge associated with the MARRIAGE ICM stipulates that bachelors can marry. However, our knowledge relating to CATHOLICISM stipulates that the Pope cannot marry. It is because of this mismatch between the MARRIAGE ICM (with respect to which BACHELOR is understood) and the CATHOLICISM ICM (with respect to which the Pope is understood) that this particular typicality effect arises.
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